


# BSI2000, Inc.



## *Trusted Optical Cards*

*Workshop on Storage and Processor Card-Based Technologies*

*National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Gaithersburg, Maryland*

*Wednesday, July 9, 2002*

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# What are *Optical Cards*?...

- ▷ Card that you carry in your *Wallet or Purse*
- ▷ Same Size and Shape as *Credit Card*
- ▷ Holds Four Megabytes of Digital Data – that's *1,500 Typewritten Pages*
- ▷ ~20-Million in Use in N.A. by 2004.




# Border Projects Today.

- ▶ USA/INS – *Green Card (PRC)*
- ▶ USA/INS – *Border Crossing*
- ▶ *Italian National ID Card*
- ▶ *Canadian PRC – Maple Leaf*
- ▶ *Saudi Arabian National ID*



# Why Optical Cards?

- ▶ ~1000x the Memory of Smart Card
- ▶ *Permanent Memory* – No Problems with Static
- ▶ *Highly Reliable* – 10 Yr Life in Harsh Env.
- ▶ Strong Identification – *Multiple Biometrics*
- ▶ *Off-Line Capability* -- Works ANYWHERE
- ▶ Complete Audit Trail on Card – 1000s of Transactions





# Border Control System

**Carta d'Identita**

Nome: GIUBILE, VANESSA  
Comune che emette il documento: ROMA  
Comune di nascita: MILANO  
Data di nascita: 04/18/09  
Sesso: F  
Estremità alto: 12345  
Statura (cm): 175  
Comune di residenza: ROMA  
Indirizzo: P.ZZA GIUSEPPE VERDI 10  
Data emissione documento: 25.02.00  
Data scadenza documento: 25.02.10  
Codice fiscale: RESMRO62R10H501Z








- ▶ Card Production Systems – *Information Spectrum, Inc.*
- ▶ Integrated Card Terminals – *BSI2000, Inc.*
- ▶ Hand Held Readers – *LaserCard Systems Corp.*

# *Data Security – Optical Cards*

- ▶ Where Do you Keep the Secret Key????
- ▶ Past Solutions – Keep it *in the Software...*
- ▶ Past Solutions -- ...*in the Microcode...*
- ▶ Past Solutions -- ...Use a *Home-Grown Keyless Crypto...*
- ▶ ..*Obfuscate the Key...*



**All are BAD!**



# New Approach Needed!



- Cryptographically Secure!
- Credibly Secure!
- *Tough Nut* (Keys!) Certified to *FIPS 140-1* (1, 2, 3).
- Enable Standard *Public Key Crypto*.
- Resistant to *Rubber Hose* Cryptanalysis.
- Prevent Cloned Cards, Records, Fraud, etc.....
- Affordable!

# Secure Optical Card Protocol - SOCP

- ▶ Combination of...
- ▶ ...Standard Optical Card *Terminal Device*
- ▶ ...Special *Crypto Hardware* (Upgrade)
- ▶ ...Standard *Crypto Software*
- ▶ ...the *SOCP Crypto Protocol*.






# Crypto 2000™




- Keys are protected to FIPS 140 –1 (1,2,3)
- Key Management Device
- Hardware Random Number Generator

## CRYPTO 2000



- *Secure Key Repository*
- *Secure Key Management*
- *Cryptographically Secure RNG*
- *Simple Plug-In Module*


# Tamper Resistance



- *In-Box* Tamper Sensor
- *On-Chip* Tamper Sensor
- *Temperature Attack* Sensor
- ...Attack Causes *Zeroization* of Battery Backed Up *SRAM*.

# Secure Optical Cards

- ▶ ...any Number of Terminals
- ▶ ...any Number of Cards...
- ▶ Record written to Card may only be Read by a Terminal in the Network.



# Crypto Write Sequence


$C2KSN, r, k \leftarrow \text{Crypto 2000}.$

$C2KSN, E_{C2K}(r, r? (DTS, CSN), k) \rightarrow \text{Optical Card}.$

$E_{C2K}(H(m)) \rightarrow \text{Optical Card}.$

$\text{Crypto 2000} \rightarrow c_0 \rightarrow \text{Optical Card}.$

$c_i = E_k(m_i? c_{i-1}) \text{ (for } i = 1, 2, \dots) \rightarrow \text{Optical Card}.$



Therefore, the complete secure record for the plaintext  $m$  is written to the optical card as:

$C2KSN, E_{C2K}(r, r? (DTS, CSN), k), E_{C2K}(H(m)), c_0, E_k(m_i? c_{i-1}) \text{ (for } i = 1, 2, \dots)$

# Crypto Read Sequence



The complete secure record read sequence to recover the plaintext  $m$  is:

$C2KSN, E_{C2KSN}(r, r? (DTS, CSN), k) \leftarrow \text{Optical Card.}$

$C2KSN, E_{C2KSN}(r, r? (DTS, CSN), k) \rightarrow \text{Crypto 2000.}$

$r, r? (DTS, CSN), k \leftarrow \text{Crypto 2000.}$

$DTS, CSN = r? (r? (DTS, CSN))$

$E_{C2KSN}(H(m)) \leftarrow \text{Optical Card.}$

$C2KSN, E_{C2KSN}(H(m)) \rightarrow \text{Crypto 2000.}$

$H(m) \leftarrow \text{Crypto 2000.}$

$c_0 \leftarrow \text{Optical Card.}$

$c_i = m_i = c_{i-1} ? D_k(E_k(m_i)) \text{ (for } i = 1, 2, \dots) \leftarrow \text{Optical Card.}$

$H(m) == H_p(m) ? (\text{Signature OK?}).$

See “*Cryptographically Secure Transactions with Optical Cards*”

<http://www.bsi2000.com/downloads.htm>

# Trust Model...


Crypto 2000 provides Data Security...

...which is NOT Trust.

Trust: “*Firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing.*” – Random House College Dictionary.



# Trust Model...



CARD is Trusted for this Specific Operation if the CSNk's can be Recovered through the Entire Chain.

Each Component of the Trust Chain Record was Written on the Specific Machines (specific Crypto 2000s).

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